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THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW:
LESSONS FROM BHOPAL
By JAMIE CASSELS*
This paper describes the course of the litigation following the Bhopal
disaster. It begins with a brief description of the various failures in risk
assessment and management that gave rise to the hazardous conditions
in Bhopal, and then describes in more detail the resulting legal
proceedings. Specifying a number of modest criteria against which the
success of the litigation can be measured, the paper examines why
traditional tort processes are unlikely to succeed in the case of mass
hazards. The paper describes and analyzes a number of significant
reforms forged by the Indian courts in response to the Bhopal disaster,
and seeks to articulate some of the lessons to be learned from these
efforts.
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L INTRODUCTION
Almost six years have passed since a massive discharge of lethal
gas from the Union Carbide factory in Bhopal India killed over
twenty-five hundred people, either as they slept or as they fled in
terror during the night. Hundreds more have since died and many
thousands remain injured or affected to this day. With the possible
exception of Chernobyl, the Bhopal disaster was the worst
single-incident industrial catastrophe in history.
This paper describes the course of the Bhopal litigation. It
examines the promises made by law to the victims of hazardous
technology and "social progress" and attempts to gauge the ability of
the legal process to keep those promises. The paper is concerned
primarily with the question of how to repair the damage resulting
from mass exposure torts, leaving aside for the time being the more
important question of how to avoid such incidents in the first place.
I first describe the challenges presented by a disaster of such
proportions and suggest a number of relatively modest criteria
against which the legal response can be measured. I then describe
some of the unique developments in the Bhopal litigation itself.
These include the consolidation of the claims by the Indian
government; the attempt to bring the action in the courts of the
United States; the formulation of a principle of absolute liability for
industrial hazards; the effort to develop a scheme for interim
compensation for the victims; and finally, the suggestion of a theory
of enterprise liability by which a multinational corporation might be
liable for the defaults of its subsidiaries. The paper concludes with
a brief account of recent developments, including the efforts by the
Indian Supreme Court to bring the legal tragedy to a close.
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Within the limits of a short paper, I seek to highlight the
problems posed by a catastrophe of such magnitude, to analyze the
succesg of the legal response, and to indicate what can be learned
from the tragedy. I should admit that this narrative is couched in
the context of considerable scepticism about the ability of both
traditional litigative responses and the private law of tort to play a
serious role in preventing such a tragedy, or to repair the human
consequences once the tragedy has occurred. One might object,
therefore, that because of the disaster's magnitude, and its unique
political, economic, and cultural context, the Bhopal case too easily
illustrates a preconceived conclusion. What I hope to demonstrate
is that while the Bhopal case may be a vivid illustration of the
problem, it is neither unique nor peculiar. And while the Bhopal
disaster must be understood in the context of the relationship
between multinationals and developing countries it cannot be
confined to that context. Indeed, a foreign observer cannot help but
be impressed by the dynamism of Indian law, and occasionally
excited by its promises. Yet in the end, the Bhopal story is one
about the limitations of law; and while the Indian legal system
differs in important ways from our own, this story holds important
lessons for us all.
II. ANATOMY OF A DISASTER
The Bhopal facility was operated by Union Carbide of India
Ltd (UCIL). The project was initiated in 1969 through negotiations
between the Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), headquartered in
the United States, and the Union of India (UOI). UCC owned 50.9
per cent of UCIL and Indian government financial institutions
owned approximately 20 per cent. The plant manufactured
pesticides and insecticides containing methyl-isocyanate (MIC). In
1980 the plant began manufacturing the MIC itself. This chemical
is known to be very dangerous - it is extremely volatile and highly
toxic. Its effects on human beings are horribly diverse and include
lung damage, blindness, emphysema, tuberculosis, spleen and liver
damage, nervous and psychological disorders, gynaecological damage,
and birth defects. On the night of 2 December 1984, a chemical
reaction ruptured the MIC storage tank and spewed an estimated
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forty-five tons of toxic gas across the city, causing a catastrophe
affecting the lives of five hundred thousand people.
The immediate cause of the disaster was probably the seepage
of water into the MIC storage tank causing an exothermic chemical
reaction. Union Carbide initially claimed the catastrophe was the
result of sabotage - blame was first laid on Sikh extremists and then
on a disgruntled employee. Little evidence was ever offered to
support these allegations; but Union Carbide scientists claimed that
accidental introduction of water into the MIC tank was technically
impossible and Union Carbide consistently maintained the sabotage
theory in anticipation of litigation. The company later claimed to
have both a witness to support its theory and a "likely candidate" for
the role of saboteur. The more widely accepted explanation of the
cause of the accident was human and technical failure during a
routine cleaning operation. A failure to maintain and close a series
of valves while flushing the system resulted in the overflow of water
into the storage tank.
Whether or not the precise details of this scenario are correct,
one thing is certain: the facility at Bhopal was a disaster waiting to
happen. While Union Carbide characterized the incident as the
result of "a unique combination of unusual events,"2  the danger
signs were there for all to see. When Union Carbide and the
government of India decided to manufacture and store large
quantities of MIC, they failed to assess the risk of locating such a
hazardous technology within an underdeveloped infrastructure. As
the risks became more apparent they failed to respond to them.
Indeed, a local journalist had been warning of the impending
1 This is the conclusion reached by most of the authors who have examined the causes
of the Bhopal disaster. For full accounts of the causes of the disaster see: A. Bhargava, "'he
Bhopal Incident and Union Carbide: Ramifications of an Industrial Accident" (1986) 18:4
Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 2; A. De Grazia, A Cloud Over Bhopal: Causes,
Consequences, and Constructive Solutions (Bombay: Kalos Foundation, 1985); L. Everest,
Behind the Poison Cloud.- Union Carbide's Bhopal Massacre (Chicago: Banner Press, 1986);
S. Hazarika, Bhopal: The Lessons of a Tragedy (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1987); P.
Shrivastava, Managing Industrial Crises: Lessons of Bhopal (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1987);
D. Weir, The Bhopal Syndrome: Pesticides, Environmen and Health (San Francisco: Sierra
Club Books, 1987).
2 Union Carbide Corporation, Bhopal Methyl Isocyanate Incident Investigation Team
Report, March 1985, cited in Everest, supra, note 1 at 17-18.
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disaster for two years.3 There had already been a series of leaks at
the plant killing one worker and injuring dozens of others,4 and
Union Carbide's own reports acknowledged a serious risk of a
further incident.5  No action was taken in response to these
warnings.
The absence of both risk assessment and hazard communication
was compounded by a series of operational and technical failures.
The Bhopal facility had been losing money for years. Skilled
employees had left, training and morale had deteriorated, and
operating procedures had become slipshod. The plant was poorly
maintained and the safety equipment - including pressure gauges,
cooling systems, flare towers, gas scrubbers, and water sprayers "-
was either inadequate or inoperative on the night of the disaster.
Ironically, in the months immediately preceding the disaster, Union
Carbide had been considering ways to divest itself of the Indian
operation.
The magnitude of the disaster was exacerbated by an absence
of planning. The plant was located close to a densely populated
area of the city. There was no information in the community about
the nature of the substances at the plant or the technological and
environmental risks. Nor were there effective warning or emergency
procedures in place, either within the plant or within the community.
The medical facilities were, of course, completely unprepared for the
disaster, and, despite valiant efforts, doctors were seriously hampered
by their lack of knowledge about the nature of the gas and the
appropriate treatment.
Nor was the legal system capable of managing the risk at
Bhopal. As in many developing nations, Indian health and safety
3 R. Keswani, "Bhopal Sitting on Top of a Volcano' and "Bhopal on the Brink of a
Disaster," referred to in affidavit of Rajkumar Keswani, in the Supreme Court of India, in
Rajkumar Keswani v. Union of India, writ petition no. 281 of 1989 (available from the author).
4 On 24 December 1981, one worker had died and three others were hospitalized
following the leak of phosgene. On 9 February 1982, twenty-five workers were hospitalized
following another leak. Reported in Union of India Memorandum, reproduced in U. Baxi &
T. Paul, eds, Mass Disasters and Multinational Liability: The Bhopal Case (Bombay: N.M.
Tripathi, 1986) at 72.
5 Reported in Union of India Memorandum, reproduced in Baxi & T. Paul, ibid at 73.
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regulations are underdeveloped and underenforced.6 Departments
are poorly funded, understaffed, and unable to manage or control
the environmental risks of the multitude of hazardous industries in
the country. International law does not fill the safety gap in
developing countries., The "soft" regulations for multinational
business and technology transfers, promulgated by international
organizations, consist of voluntary codes of conduct and non-binding
guidelines. These regulations do not reach the actual operations of
industry in developing countries! In the name of free trade and in
respect for national sovereignty, the regulation of industry is left to
the host state.
Thus the Bhopal plant had been effectively orphaned by its
parent corporation and left virtually unregulated by Indian or
international law. What happened in Bhopal was not a freak
combination of unexpected events, but a systematic series of failures:
at the planning stage; on the technological level; in the management
and operational practices; and, finally, in the social and legal
infrastructure within which the hazardous technology was located.
III. MASS DISASTERS AND THE LAW
Most lawyers would probably agree that there are two overriding
goals to achieve in designing a process to repair the damage done
in Bhopal. The first goal is to compensate the victims, and the
second is to reduce the risk of such occurrences in the future.
These two goals are limited by several considerations; but the most
important is that the solution to the problem should not itself create
further damage or impose unnecessary social costs.
6 See T. Gladwin, "A Case Study of the Bhopal Tragedy' in C.S. Pearson ed.,
Multinational Corporations, Environment, and the Third World (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1987) 3; C.M. Abraham & A. Rosencranz, "An Evaluation of Pollution Control
Legislation in India" (1986) 11 Colum. J. Envt'l L. 101; H.C. Dhalakia, "Air Pollution Control"
in S.L. Agarwal, ed., Legal Control of Environmental Pollution (Bombay: N.M. Tripathi, 1977).
7 See R.E. Lutz, "The Export of Danger A View From the Developed World" (1988)
20 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 629.
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To elaborate on these goals:
1. The process must, first and foremost, provide timely and
adequate compensation to the victims. It makes the least
sense to leave the victims, of all the parties involved, to
bear the costs of the disaster. They are blameless. They
are not direct beneficiaries of the operation and they are
in no position to prevent the disaster.
2. The costs of a hazard must be placed upon the party
who imposed those costs and benefitted from them, and,
the damages should reflect the full social costs of the
activity. This principle takes into account considerations
of deterrence and, theoretically, provides a better basis
for social cost accounting. It provides a safety incentive
insofar as it forces economic actors to factor all social
costs of production into their economic decisions.
3. There must be a provision for emergency and interim
assistance given that final compensation will take time.
4. Processing of individual claims must begin at an early
date. Otherwise, the complexity of the factual and
medical evidence will make fact determination impossible.
5. The process must be accessible to the victims. Given the
overwhelming poverty of the majority of the Bhopal
victims, they cannot be left to pursue their claims
individually. Some way to redress the massively uneven
distribution of resources between individual victims and
corporate tortfeasors must be found.
6. The structure for a solution must be cost efficient. It
should maximize the value of the available compensation
funds and minimize transactions costs - particularly,
administrative and legal costs.
When stated as the goals of a compensation system, these criteria
would be widely affirmed. However, when translated into concrete
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practices they are enormously controversial and complex, and may
well be unattainable. The Bhopal story makes this abundantly clear.
A. The Limits of Traditional Processes
The Bhopal disaster is one more example of what are
becoming known as mass disasters or mass exposure torts. Similar
incidents have occurred in Seveso, Italy in 1976; Mexico City in
1984; Basel, Switzerland in 1986; and of course, at Chernobyl. The
potential for such occurrences in Canada has been illustrated by
incidents such as the Mississauga train derailment in 1979, the
Lodgepole gas blow-out in 1982,8 and the St. Basil Le Grand PCB
warehouse fire in 1988.
Mass exposure problems are especially problematic for a
number of reasons. In the first place, they typically involve complex
technology, dangerous processes, and toxic materials. The factual
matrix is thus enormously complicated. Difficult scientific, technical,
and medical questions may be involved. The collection of data and
proof of technical and medical theories is time consuming,
controversial, and expensive. Even the question of what actually
happened in Bhopal on the night of the disaster has not been
settled and it probably never will be.
Secondly, medical causation is often difficult to establish,
injuries may remain latent for years, and the long-term health effects
of the incident may be unknown. The estimates of the number of
injured and dead in Bhopal vary by tens of thousands, and the
future medical consequences of the disaster can only be guessed. As
many commentators argue, environmental accidents and toxic torts
represent a new paradigm of "statistical causation" with which
traditional notions of proof and responsibility are incapable of
dealing.9  While the incidence of cancer, tuberculosis, asthma,
8 See Alberta Energy Resources Conservation Board, Lodgepole Blowout Report - Causes,
Effects, Actions (Calgary: Conservation Board, 1985).
9 See, for example, R.H. Gaskins, Environmental Accidents: Personal Injury and Public
Responsibility (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989); D. Rosenberg, "The Causal
Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A 'Public Law' Vision of the Tort System" (1984) 97
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miscarriage, and birth defects may vastly increase after a toxic spill,
there is no way of tracing individual cases to the spill. Doctors and
medical researchers in Bhopal confirm that many of the MIC victims
show no obvious unique physical symptoms which are distinguishable
from the health problems that occur naturally in the city.
Thirdly, under the tort system a claimant must be able to
trace causation back to the acts or omissions of a responsible party.
But mass disasters such as Bhopal typically involve multiple actors
interrelating through intricate chains of command and decision.
Individualistic tort conceptions of legal responsibility and causation
do not fit well when the incident is the result of a complex
combination of individual, corporate, and governmental decisions,
actions, and omissions. It will often be impossible to isolate
responsibility by focusing on the individual actions or omissions of
simply a few actors, and "blame" can easily be shifted from shoulder
to shoulder ad infinitum.
The large number of victims and potential victims means that
the litigation will be difficult to organize and enormously expensive.
If tried on a case-by-case basis the process could last for years,
involve a redundant and wasteful relitigation of similar issues, and
generate legal fees into the hundreds of millions of dollars. In mass
disasters the defendant can achieve economies of scale in the
preparation of the lawsuit that are unavailable to the individual
plaintiffs, thus tilting the tactical balance against the plaintiffs.
When a multinational enterprise is involved, the situation is further
complicated by transboundary issues of both a political and legal
nature.
The potential liability of the defendant is often enormous
and well beyond its insurance coverage. An adverse judgment may
threaten the economic health of the defendant and there may be
insufficient funds to meet the claims of the victims. Where the
defendant is a thinly-capitalized affiliate of a larger company, as in
the case of Bhopal, notions of limited liability and the corporate
veil may preclude full recovery. The large potential damages award
creates a strong incentive for the defendant to assume the most
Harv. L. Rev. 849 [hereinafter Public Law Vision]; J.G. Fleming, "Probabilistic Causation in
Tort Ladv' (1989) 68 Can. B. Rev. 661 [hereinafter Probabilistic Causation].
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rigidly defensive posture in an effort to use all means to avoid, or
at least postpone, a final finding of liability. Lengthy delays and
enormous costs sap the power of victims to pursue their legal
remedies in the traditional fashion.
B. Legalizing a Disaster: The Initial Skirmishing
The sheer magnitude of the disaster at Bhopal invited the
main players to consider non-traditional approaches to its solution.
The transnational nature of the dispute, its technical and legal
complexity, the enormous number of potential parties, and the
international public horror at what had happened all might have
prompted the main players to seek some quick and adequate
response to the disaster. One commentator, for example, suggested
a bilateral agreement between India and the United States to
establish a* claims tribunal funded by India, the U.S., the Union
Carbide Corporation (UCC), and Union Carbide of India Ltd.
(UCIL)!° Others suggested the creation of special courts with
expedited procedures. Few, if any, predicted that a traditional legal
response would prove adequate to meet the needs of the case.
On the other hand, so-called non-traditional solutions to
mass disasters, such as special compensation schemes, have been
criticized in many quarters. The fear is that such models remove
the burden of full compensation from industry. They risk under-
compensating the victims, and, in the end, constitute a pact between
industry and government amounting to little more than a licence to
kill.! Special tribunals may become overly bureaucratic, and
expedited procedures may require a significant relaxation of due
process. This latter feature is particularly problematic in a
transboundary case where any final judgment must be enforced in a
foreign court which might object to the process adopted in the
original jurisdiction.
10 D.B. Magraw, 'qhe Bhopal Disaster. Structuring a Solution" (1986) 57 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 835.
11 For a very effective argument along these lines, see P. Brodeur, Outrageous
Misconduct: The Asbestos Industry on Trial (New York. Pantheon, 1985).
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Whatever the merits of the alternatives, a traditional legal
response was precisely what the victims got. Both the government
of India and Union Carbide immediately assumed defensive postures
designed to control damage to their own position. Each sought to
focus public attention away from their own potential responsibilities,
to shift the locus of legal and moral blame to other parties, and to
minimize their potential exposure. Compensation of the victims
assumed a low priority against the political and economic imperatives
of litigating liability.
Immediately following the disaster American lawyers flooded
Bhopal. Within a week, hundreds of lawsuits had been filed in
various courts in India and the United States. Victims were signed
on, in some cases, at the rate of thousands per week - indicating
that they were not giving or receiving much in the way of
instructions or advice.12 While the involvement of American lawyers
in the Bhopal case may have "broken the pattern of legal
resignation"13 in India, it probably also reduced the prospect of a
quick, or non-traditional, solution. The problems were individualized
and legalized. A hundred different lawyers presented themselves as
authoritative spokespersons for the victims, a thousand legal
strategies bloomed. Settlement negotiations were begun by one
group and rejected by another. The hopes of the victims were
raised impossibly high, while behind closed doors they were being
used simply as bargaining chips by lawyers jockeying for control of
the litigation.14
While the problems were in one sense "legalized" they were
also politicized. Modern India has developed a vigorous tradition of
social activism. In the case of Bhopal, this was manifested in the
grassroots organizing of aid to the victims, the focusing of political
pressure on government through media and organized protest, and
the forming of medical and legal action groups to work for the
12 For an account of an American lawyer's involvement in Bhopal, see D.L. Rhode,
"Solicitation" (1986) 36 J. Leg. Ed. 317.
13 M. Galanter, "When Legal Worlds Collide: Reflections on Bhopal, the Good Lawyer,
and the American Law School" (1986) 36 J. Leg. Ed. 292 at 307 [hereinafter Legal Worlds].
14 See the account in 3. Jenkins, The Litigators: The Powerful World of America's High-
Stakes Trial Latyers (New York: Doubleday, 1989) at 67-120.
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victims. Most of the victims in Bhopal were poor daily wage
labourers, unable to make their individual voices heard. Collective
organization was thus needed to give them a say in their own fate.
But while social action was undoubtedly essential to safeguard the
interests of the victims, it also complicated the process further.
With so many organizations guarding the victims' interests it became
increasingly difficult to determine who spoke for whom.
IV. DEVISING A PROCESS AND FINDING A FORUM
The most obvious problems in mass tort litigation arise
simply because of the sheer number of people affected. At least
thirty-five hundred people have now died from the gas leak and
approximately forty thousand others remain seriously injured. In all,
there are more than half a million claimants. Obviously, in a case
of such proportions, traditional individualistic legal responses make
little sense. The poverty of many victims would exclude them from
any formal legal redress whatsoever. Even those who could afford
to initiate legal proceedings would not last long against the legal
artillery possessed by a multinational corporation. To litigate each
case separately would be inefficient and so wasteful of public and
private resources as to be absurd. The initial strategies of the
parties legalized the disaster by presupposing litigation; however, the
Indian government, recognizing the unparalleled nature of the
problem, sought to devise a process to overcome the obvious
limitations of individualized justice.
A. The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act
A presidential ordinance, and later a statute, made the
Indian government the exclusive representative of all the Bhopal
victims. The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act 5 applied retroactively
but preserved the right of the victims to retain counsel and required
that the government "have due regard to any matters which such
15 Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Ordinance, No. 1 of 1985; Bhopal
Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, No. 26 of 1985 (29 March 1985).
[yoL. 29 NO. 1
Lessons From Bhopal
persons may require to be urged with respect to [the] claim."16 The
Act further authorized the establishment of a Claims Scheme as the
primary mode of redress for the victims. It created a Commissioner
whose function would be to administer the scheme - registering,
recording, and processing individual claims.
This statute gave the Central Government parens patiiae
control over the Bhopal case. It purported all but to eliminate
individual pursuit of claims and proposed to substitute an
administrative framework for the disbursement of any compensation
monies. Of more immediate importance, it allowed the Indian
government to take over the litigation already commenced in the
United States, to dictate strategy, and to scuttle ongoing settlement
negotiations.
1. The bureaucratization of justice
The Bhopal Act was a limited measure. While it left open
the establishment of a compensation commission, it largely
presupposed that the solution to the disaster would be achieved
through the traditional litigation process. Its primary effect was to
shift the conduct of the litigation from the individual victims to the
government. Even this limited innovation proved highly problematic.
Had the litigation proceeded further than it did in the
United States, or had India sought to enforce a judgment there, the
legality of the Indian statute would likely have become a major
issue. Notions of individual rights and due process might well have
been deployed to undermine India's claim to parens patriae power.
American courts have held that the parens patriae jurisdiction is
appropriate only when the state has an interest in the litigation
independent of the individual interests of the citizens; and that the
procedure may not be exercised simply to collect damages for a
person who is legally entitled to an individual claim.17
16 bid at s. 4.
17 See Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 405 U.S. 251 (S.C. 1972); Pfizer, Inc. v.
Lord, 522 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1975); both discussed in the in-depth analysis of this issue by
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These same arguments have been raised in the Indian courts
by individual victims and groups dissatisfied with the government's
management of the litigation. The hostility to the Bhopal Act is
based upon the same concerns that underlieAhe traditional distrust
of class actions in mass injury suits. Opponents argue that class
actions "bureaucratize" justice by taking the conduct of the litigation
out of the hands of the victim.18 The class form, they argue, cannot
respond to the individual needs of the victims and cannot produce
a remedy tailored to the individual. The aggregation and
collectivization of claims "achieves administrative goals of efficiency,
consistency, and maximum substantive output by subordinating the
interests of individual victims (although not of defendant firms) to
the interests of the class as a whole."19
The use of parens patriae power is further problematic
because the Indian government was in a situation of considerable
conflict of interest. It is arguable that various government bodies at
the national, state, and municipal levels are legally implicated in the
tragedy. India, itself a major owner of the Bhopal enterprise, can
be viewed as lax in administering its own health and safety
requirements. Apart from the Indian government's potential legal
liability in the case, the Bhopal disaster was also to become a major
political liability for it. And the imperatives of containing political
damage control can easily conflict with the best interests of the
victims.
Objections to the bureaucratization of justice become
especially strong during settlement negotiations when, inevitably, at
least some members of the class will be dissatisfied with the
proposals. The purpose of the class action is to aggregate claims to
empower individual victims who would not otherwise have access to
L.F. Butler, "Parens Patriae Representation in Transnational Crises: The Bhopal Tragedy"
(1987) 17 Cal. W. Int'l L. J. 175.
18 For general analyses of the issue of class actions in mass tort litigation see Public Law
Vision, supra, note 9; D. Rosenberg, "Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice
by Collective Means" (1987) 62 Ind. L. J. 561 [hereinafter Class Actions]; and S. Williams,
"Mass Tort Class Actions: Going, Going, Gone?" (1983) 98 F.R.D. 323.
19 Class Actions, ibid at 565-66.
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justice. The irony is that as the process nears success it comes
under tremendous disaggregative pressures. Each time the
government and Union Carbide came close to a settlement, the
proposed agreement was met by massive protests, charges of
incompetence and collusion, occasional violence, and tremendous
confusion. Disempowered by the process, denied a voice, and
suspicious of government motives, the victims will inevitably feel
betrayed.
The bureaucratization of justice, India's potential conflict of
interest, and the disempowerment of the victims were all major
defects in the scheme framed by the government. But the failings
of the Bhopal Act do not point in favour of a return to
individualized justice. Serious as the problems were, it is crucial to
remember that the majority of the victims were poor and had no
other means of legal redress. The limitations of the scheme were
the result of the scheme's attempt to graft a public model of
administration onto a private model of litigation. The government,
itself a potential litigant, simply substituted itself as lawyer for the
victims, and thereby assumed only partial responsibility for the
victims' welfare. The Commission did make enormous efforts to
provide interim relief; however, these efforts were hindered by lack
of funding, dependence upon the final outcome of the litigation,
and public perception of the Commission as an adversarial
government agency. By providing only limited and conditional
interim relief, the scheme left the victims as stakeholders in the
litigation and, at the same time, denied them an effective say about
their future.
What these problems teach is that, at a minimum, the agency
responsible for the litigation should have greater autonomy from the
government. It should also be structured in such a way as to allow
more effective communication and participation by the victims.
Indeed, the victims came increasingly to rely on the various social
action groups to act as watchdogs and agitators on their behalf, but
these groups were consigned to the role of adversaries rather than
participants. Even more ambitiously, the scheme might have
separated entirely the issues of compensation and liability. By
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adopting a "superfund" model20 the victims could be guaranteed a
minimum level of compensation regardless of the outcome of the
litigation. Under such a model the tasks of compensation and
rehabilitation need not be subject to the delays of litigation; and the
government, as the only stakeholder in the litigation, increases its
legitimacy as parens patriae by assuming a more complete
responsibilty for the victims' welfare.
B. Finding a Forum: The U.S. Litigation
A year after the disaster, individual claims totalling 250
billion dollars had been filed in various courts in the United States.
The locus of legal activity shifted to the U.S. where the claims were
consolidated in the New York District Court. A preliminary issue
of major importance now presented itself: whether the courts of the
United States should involve themselves in the litigation on the basis
that the parent company was an American corporation.
On 1 July 1985 the Union Carbide Corporation brought a
preliminary motion to dismiss the actions from American courts on
the grounds of forum non conveniens. By now, the government of
India had taken on a major role in the litigation under the Bhopal
Act. It responded to UCC's motion by arguing that justice could
only be obtained in American courts. These arguments were
greeted with reactions ranging from outrage to resignation by the
Indian media, bench, and bar. The Chief Justice of the Indian
Supreme Court said, "It is my opinion that these cases must be
pursued in the United States ... It is the only hope these
unfortunate people have."21  Union Carbide, anxious to avoid
20 See, for example, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liabili/y Ac4 42 U.S.C.S., ch. 103, §§ 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp IV, 1986). Note that this
scheme applies by and large to clean-up costs and does not extend to compensation for
personal injuries. See also the new Ontario "Spills Bill," Part IX Environmental Protection Act,
R.S.O. 1980, c. 141, ss 79-112.
21 M. Galanter, "Legal Torpor:. Why So Little Has Happened in India After the Bhopal
Tragedy" (1985) 20 Tex. Int'l L. J. 273 at 287 [hereinafter Legal Torpor] quoting Stewart,
"Why Suits for Damages Such as Bhopal Claims are Very Rare in India" Wall Street Journal
(23 January 1985) 1.
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American tort doctrine, American damage awards, and American
juries argued that the United States was not the proper forum and
began to paint the picture of an innovative, sophisticated, and
vigorous Indian legal system, well up to the task at hand.22
1. Inconvenient forum
The American chapter of the litigation effectively came to an
end on 12 May 1986 when Judge John Keenan of the New York
District Court sent the case back to India.23 Judge Keenan's
conclusion - which was upheld in substance by the Court of
Appeal24 - was that India offered an adequate alternate forum and
that both private and public interest concerns favoured India as the
proper forum. He held that the Indian connection to the litigation
far outweighed the American. The parent corporation, he
concluded, had little involvement in the Indian operation
immediately prior to the disaster, and victims, witnesses, and
documentary evidence were located primarily in India. He found
that the plant was extensively regulated by Indian law and that it
would be paternalistic to evaluate those laws or to impose American
standards of health and safety. He held that the Indian legal system
and judiciary had the capacity to deal with complex tort claims such
as those arising out of Bhopal and concluded that
to retain the litigation in this forum ... would be yet another example of
imperialism, another situation in which an established sovereign inflicted its rules,
its standards and values on a developing nation. This Court declines to play such
a role ... To deprive the Indian judiciary of this opportunity to stand tall before the
world and to pass judgment on behalf of its own people would be to revive a
history of subservience and subjugation from which India has emerged.2 5
22 The parties' arguments are collected in Baxi & Paul, supra, note 4.
23 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)
[hereinafter Union Carbide, U.S. Distict Court].
2 4 in re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987) [hereinafter
Union Carbide, U.S. Court of Appeal].
25 Union Carbide, U.S. Distct Court, supra, note 23 at 867.
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2. A critique
While Judge Keenan's decision sounds reasonable from one
perspective, he may have tipped his hand when he concluded that
the American interest in the litigation was only ephemeral and that
the expense of a trial should not be borne by the American
taxpayer. These comments prompted Upendra Baxi, a prominent
Indian legal scholar, to refer to Keenan's judgment as "Dow-Jones
jurisprudence":
As long as no harm occurs to Americans ... how can the public interest of the
United States be ever adversely affected? Indeed, it is best served by dumping
dangerous technology on poor countries ... A more rigorously conservative view of
the public interest concerns of the United States, and a more joyous surrender of
power and discretion to do justice, than Justice Keenan's would be difficult to
locate in the recent annals of American jurisprudence.2 6
Baxi points out that the conclusion that the U.S. had no real
interest in the litigation fails to take seriously that India's claim was
against the American-based multinational and not its Indian affiliate.
Judge Keenan's approach localizes and trivializes the disaster by
presupposing that the parent company would not, and should not, be
held responsible for its overseas operations.
Measured against the criteria suggested above, the response
of American law to the disaster can only be labelled a failure. It
prolonged the litigation, and resulted in a substantive principle
whereby home states are not responsible for supervising the
activities of their corporations abroad. The principle may even
encourage corporate irresponsibility. Keenan J. was right to indicate
that the blanket imposition of American standards on a
multinational's overseas operation might be insensitive to the needs
and policies of the host country. Indeed, this is one of the most
problematic features of the ongoing attempts to formulate
international codes of conduct for transnational business. 2  But the
2 6 U. Baxi, Inconvenient Forum and Convenient Catastrophe: The Bhopal Case (Bombay:
N.M. Tripathi, 1986) at 29.
27 See Lutz, supra, note 7; G. Handl, "Environmental Protection and Development in
Third World Countries: Common Destiny - Common Responsibility" (1988) 20 N.Y.U. J.
Int'l L. & Pol. 603.
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refusal to play any supervisory role simply entrenches double
standards for safety whereby ultrahazardous products and processes
are exported from developed to developing countries, and
multinationals engage in practices abroad that would not be
tolerated in their home countries. A judicial affirmation of this
status quo confirms to the people of the third world that their lives
are considered cheap.
The refusal by American courts and regulators to assert
interest in U.S. corporate activities abroad, out of respect for
sovereignty, is somewhat disingenuous. Extraterritorial regulation
of foreign affiliates is an established instrument of U.S. domestic and
foreign policy when it is deemed suitable, for example to enforce
anti-trust policy or trading bans on hostile countries. To treat
health and safety matters as the purely "private" concerns of the
corporation and its host country ignores that the most significant
arena in which modern-day imperialism is played out is the
international economy. The decision not to regulate MNC's does
not avoid, but rather licences this form of domination. Indeed,
insofar as the decision defers to Indian law and the apparent
autonomy of Union Carbide's Indian operation, it may encourage
the parent corporation to further reduce its involvement in
supervising the health and safety of its operations in third world
countries. And Judge Keenan's message has not fallen on deaf ears.
The general counsel for a major multinational has recently said:
Ironically the existence of pervasive and intrusive regulation by the foreign
jurisdiction may have the effect of reinforcing a district court's willingness to dismiss
a case brought by foreign plaintiffs. This type of regulation, while bothersome as
a compliance matter, may have the unintended benefit of reinforcing the local
interest in the controversy
The conclusion drawn is that legal responsibility can be avoided by
emphasizing local government regulation and delegating to the
subsidiary "as much autonomy as possible concerning operating
28 A.C. Seward III "After Bhopal: Implications For Parent Company Liability" (1987)
21 Int'l Law. 695 at 706. A.C. Seward III is Associate General Counsel and Secretary for
Upjohn International Inc.
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matters. 29  Multinationals should maintain strategic control from
afar but leave operations in the hands of local managers and safety
in the hands of the host government. Control can thus be
maintained, while responsibility avoided. Arguably, this is precisely
what happened in Bhopal.
Finally, while a "hands-off' approach may be justified on the
basis of a respect for Indian sovereignty and its legal process,
American law remained a brooding presence in the background and
a significant limitation on the Indian legal process. Any judgment
of an Indian court would have to be enforced in the United States;
and as Judge Keenan said in his decision, recognition of an Indian
judgment would be contingent upon its conformity to "minimal
requirements of due process."30 While the "innovativeness" of the
Indian courts was one of the reasons for returning the case to India,
that same innovativeness was later characterized by Union Carbide
as a failure of due process and as a sufficient reason not to
undertake to submit to Indian jurisdiction.
V. THE LITIGATION IN INDIA
Having successfully returned the case to India, Union
Carbide reversed its position. Indeed, even before leaving the
American courts it sought to revoke its consent to abide by Indian
jurisdiction on the basis that "Indian courts, while providing an
adequate alternate forum, do not observe due process standards that
29 [emphasis omitted]. See Seward, ibid at 706-7. "he analysis followed by Judge
Keenan suggests a need for a clear delineation of responsibility between headquarters
management and subsidiary personnel, with delegation to subsidiary management of as much
autonomy as possible concerning operating matters and restriction of headquarters management
to strateg and policy issues."
30 Union Carbide, U.S. District Court, supra, note 23 at 867. This specific wording of this
condition was removed by the Court of Appeal on the basis that it might imply a lesser
standard to be met for enforcement. The Court of Appeal stated that: "Any denial by the
Indian courts of due process can be raised by UCC as a defense to the plaintiffs' later attempt
to enforce a resulting judgment against UCC in this country." See Union Carbide, US. Court
of Appeal, supra, note 24 at 205.
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would be required as a matter of course in this country."'' 1 Having
expressed compassion for the victims, Union Carbide refused to
abide by orders to pay interim compensation. Having convinced
U.S. courts not to export American justice to India, Union Carbide
then sought to export American notions of due process to resist
judicial efforts in favour of the victims.
Union Carbide, like most other observers, knew that, without
radical innovation, Indian tort law and civil procedure were not
likely to provide a speedy resolution to the dispute. While the
company originally denied the defects of the Indian legal system, it
could not have been surprised that four and a half years after the
disaster, the case had still not even reached discovery, much less a
trial on the merits.
As India's own critique of its legal system revealed, the
procedural and substantive problems were bound to be formidable.32
The law of torts in India remains unsystematic and relatively
undeveloped. It is entirely neglected by many works on Indian law
and is infrequently resorted to by the populace.33 There are no civil
juries and damage awards are very low. Courts are overworked and
understaffed and delays are long. Pretrial procedures are limited in
comparison to the United States, discovery is minimal, and the
collection of evidence is difficult. Judge Keenan had recognized this
latter problem, and as one of the conditions of ordering the case
back to India, he had required Union Carbide to submit to discovery
31 Union Carbide U.S. Court of Appeal, supra, note 24 at 204.
32 The following is distilled primarily from affidavit by Marc Galanter on Behalf of the
Government of India's Motion in Opposition to Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss, reprinted
in Baxi & Paul, supra, note 4 at 161. See also Legal Worlds, supra, note 13 and Legal Torpor,
supra, note 21.
33 Legal Worlds, supra, note 13 at 296. Galanter notes that a fifty-year survey found that
cases of malicious prosecution outnumbered those for negligence (from R. Ramamoorthy,
"Difficulties of Tort Litigants in India" (1970) 12 J. Indian L. Inst. 313); and in his own ten-
year survey Galanter found only fifty-two reported tort cases that were other than motor
vehicle accidents. Of these, only twenty-two were negligence cases apd none of these involved
products liability or industrial or chemical mishaps. The cases took an average of twelve years
and nine months. Average recovery of successful plaintiffs was 15,159 rupees (1,263 dollars).
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by India according to the broader American rules.3 4  On a
subsequent appeal, Union Carbide had successfully applied to have
this condition dissolved on the ground that it was not reciprocally
imposed on India3 5 There are no contingency fees, and heavy ad
valorem court charges make it virtually impossible for the poor to
seek legal redress. There is very little specialization in the
profession and most lawyers are sole practitioners with almost no
fact-finding facilities. When these obstacles are added together, it
is fair to conclude, as Marc Galanter has, that "[d]isasters large and
small in India typically have no legal consequences.l3 6 Some have
suggested that the virtual nonexistence of legal redress for personal
injuries is an aspect of the karmic fatalism that characterizes the
vision of life in India. 37 Whatever the explanation, at least until
now, the law of tort in India has been little more than a myth about
how people would be cared for in a better world.
Notwithstanding this gloomy scenario, it is also true that
when fully galvanized the Indian legal system is one of the most
dynamic in the common law world. Over the past several decades,
lawyers, social activists, and the courts in India have demonstrated
a remarkable degree of social and legal creativity and have expended
enormous effort in an attempt to make law work for the poor.
Especially under the banner of Public Interest Litigation, courts have
sought to enhance access to justice, expedite legal processes, and
breathe substantive life into the formal promises of law.38 They
have liberalized the rules of standing, provided funding for public
interest activists, dispensed with formal procedural requirements, and
elaborated substantive rights designed to enhance the welfare of the
poor and oppressed. These rights include the right to a speedy
Union Carbide, U.S. District Court, supra, note 23 at 867.
35 Union Carbide, U.S. Court of Appeal, supra, note 24 at 205-6.
36 Legal Torpor, supra, note 21 at 280.
37 R. Dhavan, "For Whom? And For What? Reflections on the Legal Aftermath of
Bhopal" (1985) 20 Tex. J. Int'l L. 295 at 302.
38 See J. Cassels, "Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation in India: Attempting
the Impossible?" (1989) 37 Am. J. Comp. L 495.
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trial,39 the right to legal aid,40 the right to a livelihood, 41 a right
against pollution,42 and the right to human dignity.
43
Therefore, it is no surprise that during the course of the
Bhopal litigation a number of innovations have been attempted.
The remaining sections will very briefly review the following
developments: first, the articulation of a theory of strict liability for
industrial hazards; secondly the suggestion of a theory of
multinational enterprise liability; and finally, the effort to devise a
system of interim compensation.
A. Substantive Concerns: Proof of Liability and the Standard of
Care
In September 1986 the Union of India formally filed suit
against Union Carbide in the District Court of Bhopal, claiming 3.3
billion dollars. It based its claim upon misrepresentation, breach of
warranty, negligence, and strict and absolute liability. It alleged that
Union Carbide had provided a faulty design, that it stored excessive
quantities of the lethal chemical in an inadequate containment
system, and that it was aware of the toxic properties of the chemical
and the hazardous nature of the operation, yet it took no steps to
control the danger. Union Carbide, in turn, reiterated its sabotage
theory, denied that it had any involvement in the Bhopal operation,
and alleged contributory negligence by India in allowing slums to
grow in the immediate vicinity of the plant and failing to enforce its
own safety standards.
3 9 Madhav Hayawadanrao Hoskot v. Maharashtra (State of) (1978), 3 S.C.C. 544, A.I.R.
1978 S.C. 1548; Hassainara Kihatoon v. Home Secretary, Bihar (State of), A.LR. 1979 S.C. 1360,
1369, 1377.
40 M H. Hoskot, ibid
41 Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corp. (1985), 3 S.C.C. 545, A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 180.
42 Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun v. Uttar Pradesh, State of, A.I.R.
1985 S.C. 652.
4 3 Francis Coralie Mullin v. Administrator, Delhi (Union Territoy of) (1981), 2 S.C.R. 516,
ALR. 1981 S.C. 746.
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Indian tort law is based on English common law. The victim
of an injury must prove not only that the defendant caused the
harm, but also that the defendant was at fault or negligent by failing
to use reasonable care to prevent the injury. To establish liability
in negligence it would have to be shown that UCC had a duty to
oversee its Bhopal operation; that it breached that duty by failing to
use reasonable care; that this failure caused the gas leak; and that
the gas caused the damage suffered by each individual victim. These
requirements, coupled with limited production and discovery
procedures, make the problems of proof in a mass disaster case
daunting indeed. It is not too surprising that throughout the entire
process of the litigation, it never became clear exactly how the
disaster occurred.
Even if the standard of strict liability in Rylands v. Fletcher44
applies, the battle is uphill. UCC would argue, for example, that
the manufacture of pesticides is neither ultra-hazardous nor a
"non-natural" use of land.4 5  UCC's steadfast insistence on a
sabotage theory might also provide a defence to strict liability based
on the notion that the damage was caused by the wilful intervention
of a stranger and was, therefore, not the act of Union Carbide.
Finally, it would continue to shift liability to other actors, including
the workers and management of the local operation, the state and
federal governments, and to insist on the protection afforded by its
corporate veil.
The principle of strict liability has not met with great judicial
favour and may be merging into the law of negligence and
nuisance.4 6 This trend might be explained by the increased
prominence of social insurance schemes as mechanisms of loss
44 (1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 265, aff'd (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
45 For a full analysis of the strict liability argument, see P.T. Muchlinski, "The Bhopal
Case: Controlling Ultrahazardous Industrial Activities Undertaken by Foreign Investors"
(1987) 50 Mod. L Rev. 545.
4 6 J.G. Fleming, The Law of Torts, 6th ed. (Sidney. Law Book Company, 1983) at 307-8.
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spreading, and the lesser need for judicial invention.47  If so, then
given the absence of social insurance in India, the Indian courts
would arguably be justified in adopting a more activist stance. This
is precisely what they have done.
1. Shriram fertilizers
Exactly one year after the Bhopal disaster, a leak of toxic oleum
gas from the Shriram fertilizer factory in north Delhi claimed the
life of one person and injured hundreds of others. The Delhi
administration immediately closed down the plant, and a public
interest application was brought on behalf of the victims to the
Supreme Court.
In December 1986, Bhagwati C.J. (retired) gave the court's
ruling on the issue of liability.48 While accepting that the chemical
industry was necessary to the economy of India, he reasoned that
the social costs of industrial development should not be borne by
individual workers and citizens. He held that an enterprise engaged
in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities owes an "absolute
and non-delegable duty to the community" to ensure that no harm
is done:
[I]f any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely liable
to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that
it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without negligence on its
part. Since the persons harmed on account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous
activity carried on by the enterprise would not be in a position to isolate the process of
operation from the hazardous preparation of substance or any other related element that
caused the harm the enterprise must be held strictly liable for causing such harm as part
of the social cost for carrying on the ... activity.
4 9
The court found further support for this principle since "the
enterprise alone has the resource to discover and guard against
47 Fleming, ibida, citing Tylor, 'The Restriction of Strict Liability' (1947) 10 Mod. L.
Rev. 396, and Friedmann, "Social Insurance and the Principles of Tort Liability' (1949) 63
Harv. L. Rev. 241.
4 8 M.C Mehta v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 S.C. 1086.
49 Ibid at 1099.
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hazards or dangers and to provide warning"50 and the victims are
not in a position to overcome the problems of proof.
In the context of environmental and industrial hazards, a
principle of absolute liability ensures that the full social costs of
production are considered in making risk management decisions. It
relieves the claimant of the near impossible tasks of proving factual
causation and negligence, affirms the value of compensation to
innocent victims of industrial progress, and is consistent with the
notion of "polluter pays."51 Internationally, the Shriram judgment
was acclaimed as an important contribution to the common law, and
locally it was seen to have bestowed an important bargaining
endowment on the victims' side of the litigation. It was greeted
with enthusiasm by many activist groups and was seen to provide a
precedent that might hasten a speedy and more generous settlement.
That these hopes proved unfounded is one of the more significant
lessons of Bhopal.
B. Allocating Responsibility: MNCs and the Corporate Veil
A standard of absolute liability does not, of course, advance
the case very much if Union Carbide is not the proper party to the
dispute. UCC maintained throughout that while it was the majority
owner of Union Carbide of India Ltd (UCIL), the two companies
are separate corporate entities and that its relationship with the
Indian facility was at arm's length. It thus presented itself as a
passive investor in the Indian operation, exercising no control or
authority over its day-to-day operations. Indeed, lawyers for UCC
denied that there is any such entity as a "multinational corporation"
or that the American company had any operations outside the
United States. UCC maintained that the relationship between itself
and UCIL was so remote that it would be both unjust and illegal to
hold it responsible for damage caused by faulty operation of the
Bhopal plant.
50 Ibid
51 For recent legislation in this direction see the new Ontario "Spills Bill," supra, note 20.
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The legal issues here are misleadingly simple. First, does a
parent corporation have a direct duty to manage its subsidiaries in a
competent fashion? And secondly, apart from its direct duties to
the community, is the parent company vicariously or otherwise liable
for the acts of its subsidiaries?
India sought to implicate the parent company on both these
fronts. It alleged that Union Carbide owed a direct duty in both
tort and contract to supervise the Bhopal operation, to maintain
standards, to update safety systems, to provide current information,
and to warn of hazards. Perhaps more importantly, India sought to
establish the principle that, in some circumstances, a parent company
must be held responsible for the delicts of a subsidiary. This is the
theory of multinational enterprise liability. The argument is based
upon the proposition that the web of companies under the financial
control of the multinational are part of a single economic group
with common objectives. Just as the parent corporation maintains
control over the group, so must it maintain financial responsibility
for its various endeavours.5 2
The American courts had not been much impressed by
India's argument that a multinational might be responsible for the
operations of its subsidiary. Both Judge Keenan and the Court of
Appeal accepted Union Carbide's evidence that it had not been
involved in the construction and operation of the Bhopal plant, that
its relationship with UCIL was at arm's length, and that the Indian
operation was quite autonomous from UCC control. Perhaps not
surprisingly, Indian courts have revealed that they have a different
view of the realities of multinational business in the developing
world.
52 See J.L Westbrook, '"heories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for an
International Settlement" (1985) 20 Tex. Int'l L J. 321; D. Aronofsky, "Piercing the
Transnational Corporate Veil: Trends, Developments and the Need for Widespread Adoption
of Enterprise Analysis" (1985) 10 N.C. . Int'l L. & Comp. Reg. 31; T. Hadden, R.E. Forbes
& R.L. Simmonds, Canadian Business Organizations Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 1984) at
639-52.
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1. Water down the Ganges
Much to Union Carbide's horror, there has been some
indication that the Indian courts will be willing to lift the corporate
veil in the Bhopal case. In related interlocutory proceedings
concerning its liability to pay interim relief to the victims, Union
Carbide argued that the case against it should be dismissed on the
basis of its separate corporate personality5 3 However, in the
Madhya Pradesh High Court, Seth J. suggested that "much water has
flown down the Ganges since it was first held in Salomon v.
Salomon ... as an absolute principle that a corporation or company
has a legal and separate identity of its own."
5 4
Seth J. noted the increasing number of exceptions to the
principle of separate corporate personality and suggested: "It may
be that in course of time these exceptions may grow in number and
to meet the requirements of different economic problems, the theory
about the personality of the corporation may be confined more and
more."55 Thus, the corporate veil may be lifted where
fraud or improper conduct is intended to be prevented or a taxing statute or a
benevolent statute is [s]ought to be evaded or where associated companies are
inetricably connected as to be in reality part of one concern. It is neither necessary
nor desirable to enumerate the class of cases where lifting the veil is pennissible.
5 6
Seth J. concluded on the basis of the evidence adduced so
far that UCC had real control over the Bhopal plant. It was the
majority shareholder, and controlled the composition of the board of
directors and management of the Indian company. If, as Union
Carbide argued, it chose not to involve itself in the operation and
53 Union of India v. Union Carbide Corp. Ltd (M.P.H.C.) [Unreported] (manuscript
available from the author).
54 bid at para. 14.02.02 [emphasis added].
5 5 Ibid
5 6 ibid at para. 14.02.03 quoting from Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Escorts Ltd
A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 1370.
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safety of the foreign company, that was "entirely its choice and such
a policy could not absolve it from its liability."57
Limited liability is recognized as a useful instrument for the
allocation of risk and the generation of capital for industrial
ventures. By limiting the potential liability of investors, the law
provides an incentive to investment and avoids unfairly surprising
remote owners with undue managerial responsibility or financial risk.
An outright abolition of the notions of corporate personality and
limited liability could well have serious adverse consequences for a
developing nation's ability to attract international investment.
Multinationals will cry foul and will warn of capital flight. They will
argue that such an approach would penalize offshore investors and
would make it impossible to evaluate the level of financial risk on
any investment or project. The enterprise liability approach
threatens to rewrite the responsibilities undertaken by the parties,
for example, by turning a simple technology transfer into a joint
venture or partnership. It fails to recognize that many affiliates and
subsidiaries really do operate in an autonomous fashion and
threatens to force multinationals to take a role in domestic
management beyond what it, or even the host state, desires.
But both the benefits of limited liability and the objections
to enterprise liability may be overstated. Especially in the case of
a multinational business organization, the corporate form can too
easily be used to avoid taking responsibility for risk. By pursuing
their purposes through a network of formally independent
subsidiaries, a multinational's assets can be widely dispersed and
placed beyond the reach of the law. Through transfer pricing
techniques, high-risk subsidiaries can be maintained on the
borderline of solvency. Unlike commercial creditors, victims of
corporate torts do not know in advance the risk of "dealing with" a
limited liability corporation, and can not protect themselves against
that risk. 8 To hold the parent liable is often the only way to
57 Ibid at para. 14.03.02.
58 Thus, for example, Welling says that the argument for limited liability is not strong
in the case of torts as opposed to consensual debts. A contractual creditor is aware that a
limited liability company is being dealt with, can investigate its credit, demand additional
security, or accept the risk of insolvency. A tort creditor is a stranger who has no such
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ensure full compensation for these victims and to encourage the
parent company to exercise greater responsibility in controlling its
foreign operations.
The principle of limited liability is an instrument of public
policy and is ultimately justifiable only when grounded in the public
good. In the Bhopal case, the calculus of public benefit points
toward a finding of liability. Union Carbide was the primary
economic beneficiary of the hazardous activity and the victims are
blameless. The parent company's control of technology, finances,
the board of directors, and company management gave it effective
control over the direction and operation of its subsidiary. The
parent company's choice to abdicate this power is as much a reason
for imposing liability as denying it. As between the parent company
and the subsidiary it is impossible to pinpoinf responsibility for
particular risks. Victims are not in a position to isolate which part
of the monolithic concern caused the harm or should have
prevented it.
Most advocates of enterprise liability recognize that the
principle should not be absolute. For some purposes, the foreign
affiliate will be an independent company and to ignore its autonomy
in some spheres of its operations would be inappropriate and lead
to a flight of capital 5 9 However, in other spheres, especially those
concerning workplace safety and risk management, there should be
minimum standards of parent company responsibility.60 Such an
approach to enterprise liability would go some way toward
eliminating the lower standard of safety in developing countries. If
suitably defined, the principle might not significantly increase
investor risk. It would put the parties on notice as to what their
obligations are and would remove the incentive to allow an orphan
operation to run on while imposing unacceptable hazards. The
opportunity. See B. Welling, Corporate Law in Canada: The Governing Principles (Toronto:
Butterworths, 1984) at 146-49.
59 For example, Aronofsky suggests that there should be a presumption of parent
company responsibility that can be rebutted where the parent company can show that "its
conduct and economic status within an enterprise are completely unrelated to the dispute
before the court." Supra, note 52 at 32.
60 See, for example, Westbrook, supra, note 52.
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principle might allow, and indeed encourage, "the parties to spell out
more carefully in the initial agreements what their respective
obligations are.
It is too early to say what effect absolute and enterprise
liability decisions will have on the investment climate in India. In
recent negotiations with the Union of India, potential investors have
raised the Bhopal judgments as a concern. 61 It has been reported
that one company has postponed its investment decision partly out
of its concern on these grounds62 and the government has been
urged to relax the law. While this is not politically feasible at this
time, officials have noticed a slowdown in the rate of growth of U.S.
investment and acknowledge the possible costs of the Bhopal
judgments.63 On the other hand, it should also be realized that
these "radical" reforms have not yet translated into any cost for
industry, and as one director of a large multinational said, "I doubt
whether any chemical company in the world defers an investment in
India on this ground. Investments are more of an economic
question."64
C. And In the Meantime, What of the Victims?
Each one of the developments described have been greeted
with enthusiasm. However, a crucial question in any litigation is
how to care for the victims until final compensation is available.
This problem is particularly acute in Bhopal where the victims are
overwhelmingly poor and social welfare systems are unavailable to
provide basic care. As long as three years after the disaster, the
case had not come to trial and the victims had received almost no
interim assistance. Lawyers for both parties had been exchanging
61 S.S. Suni, Joint Secretary, Department of Chemicals and Petrochemicals, Ministry of
the Environment (personal interview, 6 December 1989).
62 Economic Thnes (27 October 1989) 8.
63 Suri, supra, note 61.
64 Statement by NV. Grubman, Director of Unilever, reported in Economic Times (27
October 1989) 8.
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revised pleadings and bringing numerous interlocutory motions.
Union Carbide had taken the position that the action could not
proceed until India provided full particulars of the extent and nature
of the victims' injuries. Such a request, reasonable in the context of
ordinary litigation, was clearly impossible to satisfy in the case of
Bhopal. The machinery set up by the Bhopal Act to document the
claims was handicapped by inadequate resources and insufficient
knowledge about the short-term and long-term effects of MIC
poisoning; and had been overwhelmed by the number of claims and
the enormity of its task.
Out of frustration with the proceedings, one of the social
activist groups brought an application seeking to have the litigation
transferred to the Madhya Pradesh High Court for expedited
proceedings.65 Thecourt refused to grant the petition. It accepted
that in such complex litigation, lengthy pre-trial proceedings were
inevitable as the parties sought to frame the issues for trial. It
denied that UCC and the government were unreasonably delaying
the proceedings. However, the court did say:
Before parting, we must direct the parties to fully co-operate in the early disposal
of the claim cases in order that the victims of the tragedy get justice without further
delay. We also direct the District Judge to examine what interim relief can be
granted to ameliorate the conditions of the victims and minimise the human
sufferings, especially of the legal heirs of 2500 or so persons who died in the
tragedy and those who have been permanently disabled and are not in a position
to earn their livelihood and having nothing to fall back upon.
66
Throughout 1987, Judge Deo of the Bhopal District Court
had been pressing the parties to reach an out of court settlement.
On 18 December 1987, when the most recent settlement
negotiations broke down, he ordered Union Carbide to pay 3.5
billion rupees (270 million dollars) in interim compensation to the
Bhopal victims. He commented that "It cannot be denied that an
unprecedented tragedy took place on account of a deadly leak ...
Can the gas victims survive till the time all the tangible data with
66 !bid at 210.
65 Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1988 M.P. 206.
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meticulous exactitude is collected and adjusted in fine forensic style
for working out the final amount of compensation with precision?"6
Union Carbide spokespersons responded with anger,
repeating their claim that the gas leak was the result of sabotage by
an Indian employee of UCIL and claiming that the court order
amounted to awarding damages without a trial. The judgment was
immediately appealed by Union Carbide to the Madhya Pradesh
High Court. Lawyers for UCC argued that the order had no basis
in law, that it was punitive in nature, and that in making it, Judge
Deo had succumbed to political pressure, substituting an emotional
response in place of legal judgment.
1. The revenge of the colonies
On 4 April 1988, Justice S.K Seth of the Madhya Pradesh
High Court. upheld the order, though he reduced the amount.68
Justice Seth took as his springboard section 20 of the English
Administration of Justice Act which provides for interim
compensation in certain circumstances. 69 This provision, passed well
after Indian independence, is not part of Indian law. However,
Indian law at independence, like Canadian common law, was derived
and adapted from the English according to the principles of 'Justice,
equity, and good conscience." This principle, familiar to many
ex-colonial nations, is generally understood to mean the rules of
English law if found applicable to local society and circumstances.
Indian courts have previously modified their common law
following statutory reform in England. One example is the case of
Kidya Devi v. M.P.S.R.T. Corp.70 in which the court refused to apply
the traditional common law doctrine of contributory negligence.
67 Union of India v. Union Carbide Corporation; Gas Claim No. 1113 of 1986 (17
December 1987, Bhopal Dist. Ct) at 14-15 [unreported] (Manuscript available from the
author).
68 Supra, note 53.
69 The Administration of Justice Act (County Court) 1969, c. 58.
70 A.I.R. 1975 M.P. 89.
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The English doctrine had, by this time, been altered by the
Contributory Negligence Act and there was no equivalent legislation
in India. However, the Indian Supreme Court held that the law of
India must also be changed to conform with the general principle of
justice, equity, and good conscience.
There is no doubt a presumption that a rule of common law is in consonance with
justice, equity and good conscience. But how can that presumption continue if the
country of its origin has itself rejected the rule and has made new rules in its place.
If the new rules of English law replacing or modifying the common law are more
in consonance with justice, equity and good conscience, it would be open to us to
reject the outmoded rules of common law and to apply the new rules7
Following this reasoning, Justice Seth concluded that a
principle of interim compensation could appropriately be adopted in
the case at hand.
It does not require much of an argument to accept that the intervening period
between commencement of an action and its ultimate trial in a suit for damages
especially when based on a tort cause[s] a greater hardship in a developing country
like India than in a developed country like England. As such, there exist[s] no valid
ground why the abovesaid set of statutory rules ... could not be adapted with
suitable modifications as a part of Indian common law and applied to the Bhopal
suit.72
Given the evidence adduced so far about the causes of the
disaster, the control exercised by UCC over UCIL, and the Shri rarn
principle of absolute liability, Seth J. concluded that a prima facie
case had been made out against the parent corporation. Thus, it
was appropriate to require UCC to provide interim relief.
As throughout the litigation, Union Carbide lawyers objected
to the "lawlessness" of the Indian courts in going beyond precedent
to forge a principle of absolute liability, to pierce the corporate veil,
and to order interim compensation. They intimated that they would
not comply with the order and would resist its enforcement in the
United States on the grounds that it failed to comply with "due
process." While much of this was posturing, Union Carbide's
objections will strike many North American lawyers as quite
71 ]bid at 92.
72 Union of India, supra, note 53 at para 13.01.07.
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reasonable since they are based upon widely shared cultural
assumptions about the rule of law.
Yet, while it is technically correct to say that Justice Seth's
order was novel, it was no more novel than other remedies the
courts have fashioned to do justice in particular cases. For example,
the Mareva injunction 73 and Anton Piller orders74 are widely used,
and equally draconian, pre-trial remedies forged by judicial
legislation to protect plaintiffs facing a drawn-out trial.75 Similarly,
the notions of absolute responsibility for hazardous activities and
enterprise liability are not simply "Third World brainstorm[s], 76 but
have a respectable toehold in North American common law and
legislation. Perhaps more importantly, there is a certain
ethnocentricity in imposing the North American legalistic
understanding of the judicial function upon Indian courts. In their
effort to make law work for the poor, Indian judges have departed
considerably from the traditional positivist understanding of law,
rejecting the "bureaucratic tradition" of rule-bound adjudication. As
the former chief justice said, legalism is a myth designed to insulate
judges from popular scrutiny.77 Instead, many Indian judges perceive
that their task is to alleviate human suffering and achieve social
justice. In pursuing this task, they frequently go beyond the judicial
role as understood in England and North America, while maintaining
tremendous popular and political legitimacy.78 Union Carbide's
73 Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A., [1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep.
509 (C.A.).
74 Anton Pilfer KG v. Manufacturing Processes Ltd, [1976] Ch. 55 (C.A.).
75 The order was, perhaps, defective in that while it was interlocutory in nature it
envisaged no mechanism whereby Union Carbide could claim reimbursement in the event that
they should win at trial. The simple expedient of requiring an undertaking from tile Union
of India to this effect would have made it far more palatable. However, given that the
application had been brought, not by the government, but by an intervenor, and because of
the large sum at stake, such a requirement was not feasible.
76 Westbrook, supra; note 52 at 324.
77 P.N. Bhagwati, "Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation" (1985) 23 Colum. J.
Transnat'l L. 561.
78 See Cassels, supra, note 38.
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primary argument for the case's dismissal from the U.S. was that
the Indian judiciary is capable of substantial innovation and can deal
with a large-scale disaster. Given this argument, one might be
excused for thinking that it would ill-behoove Union Carbide to later
object to the anti-legalistic features of the Indian legal system.
VI. SETILING A DISPUTE
A. Settling
Following the interlocutory decision of Justice Seth, Union
Carbide repeated its now familiar line that the judgment was bound
to lead to further litigation on the basis that Justice Seth appeared
to have "virtually decided the liability question" and had violated the
company's right to due process. 79 The company appealed the order
once again. This was the first time the Supreme Court of India
obtained jurisdiction in the Bhopal case.
In the Supreme Court, the procedural and substantive issues
merged. Government lawyers apparently decided that the only way
to support the interlocutory judgment was to demonstrate that any
final decision would clearly place liability upon UCC. The appeal
thus assumed the proportions of a full-blown trial on the merits.
All the parties were clearly unhappy with this development. The
factual basis for the arguments was insufficiently developed to enable
UOI to present its arguments, to allow UCC to respond, or to allow
the court to decide. UOI was forced to make the legal argument
that, regardless of how the accident happened, and irrespective of
the connection between UCC and its subsidiary, UCC was legally
responsible for the accident. UCC argued that this was simply an
untenable legal position. It objected to the factual theory
presupposed by this argument, to the introduction of new evidence
in appellate proceedings, and to the legal theory presented by the
government. In particular, it attacked the Shriram judgment as
politically motivated judicial legislation that was out of line with
Indian law.
"Carbide Told to Pay $195 Million" New York Times (5 April 1988) D1.
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On 14 February 1989, after four months of preparation and
oral argument, Chief Justice R.S. Pathak interrupted a government
lawyer's argument to order Union Carbide to pay 470 million dollars
in damages8 0 He said that in light of "the enormity of the human
suffering occasioned by the Bhopal gas disaster and the pressing
urgency to provide immediate and substantial relief to victims of the
disaster" the case was "pre-eminently fit for an overall settlement."81
The order was in final settlement of all claims and would discharge
Union Carbide from all future civil or criminal liability. Both sides
greeted the ruling with enthusiasm.
It is unlikely that the final judgment was truly "imposed" by
the court. Indian courts involve themselves more intimately in the
litigation process than American or Canadian courts, but they do not
generally "impose settlements" on the parties. The government and
Union Carbide had been engaged in a series of secret talks for
several weeks; and, it has been suggested, both accepted the court
ruling without consulting their clients and "with an alacrity indicating
a prior out-of-court agreement."82  Many have speculated that the
interposition of the Supreme Court into the settlement may have
been a formal move designed to enhance the credibility of the
settlement and to protect the parties - especially the government -
from criticism. A national election was approaching in India, and,
as one government official said: "We feel that once the Supreme
Court says it's fair, the government will be on a strong wicket."83
The settlement seemed clearly to be a victory for Union
Carbide. On the day it was announced, the price of its shares on
the New York stock market rose by two dollars. The amount of the
award is paltry in comparison to the government's claim for 3.3
billion dollars and Union Carbide's share is no more than the
current value of the 350 million dollars for which it had offered to
80 Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1989) 1 S.C.C. 674; S. Hazarika,
"Bhopal Payments by Union Carbide Set at $470 Million" New York Times (15 February 1989)
Al & D3.
81 Union Carbide, ibid at 675.
82 "Settling for Less" Far Eastern Economic Review (2 March 1989) 27.
8 3 Asian Wall Street Journal (15 February 1989).
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settle the suit in 1986. It is approximately the same amount
(present value) of the 500-650 million dollars in staggered payments
that Union Carbide was rumoured to have offered in November
1987. These negotiations had collapsed in the face of protests
organized by victims groups and other social activists.
Why settle? With elections approaching, the case was clearly
a political liability for the Indian government. The case had still not
come to trial in the District Court and the litigation promised to
drag on indefinitely. Even if the government had won on the issue
of liability, it is not clear what damages it would have recovered, or
that it would have been able to enforce the judgment in the
American courts. UCC had refused to submit to the jurisdiction of
the Indian Supreme Court. It had also intimated that it would resist
enforcement of any judgment in the United States, assuming (quite
correctly) there was a good chance that American courts would view
the order as suspicious and as failing to comply with the "minimal
due process" requirement.
Opposition politicians, victims' groups, and social activists
immediately condemned the settlement as woefully inadequate and
as confirmation that third world life is cheap. The settlement
provoked mass protests by victims' groups and prompted the
opposition parties to walk out of parliament. Twenty-five hundred
survivors made the journey by train from Bhopal to Delhi to protest.
Two prominent former Supreme Court judges condemned the
settlement; one, P.N. Bhagwati, concluded that "the multinational
has won and the people of India have lost."84 The critics of the
settlement were, in turn, chastised for building unrealistic hopes for
the victims, being insensitive to their immediate needs, and placing
the desire for a novel legal precedent above the necessity of
alleviating suffering.
The basis upon which the settlement was calculated was not
known for some time. Its adequacy was attacked by comparing it to
84 P.N. Bhagwati, former Chief Justice of India, 'Travesty of Justice" Idia Today (15
March 1989) 45. See also the remarks of K. Iyer in The Hindu (6 May 1989) 8: "Obviously
the judges shared the concern for the victims and were worried by the tantalizing length of
a looming, looney litigation with a foreign jurisdiction and Keenan jurisprudence to upset
Bharat justice. Probably, Carbide blackmail, in the context of UCI assets being but a poor
sum, that battles would be waged in the U.S. to delay and defeat the Delhi decree oppressed
the naive psyche of the brethern into greeting any settlement as a fair adjustment."
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the Johns-Manville asbestos settlement of 2.5 billion dollars (to
60,000 victims), and the A.H. Robbins (Dalkon Shield) settlement of
2.9 billion dollars (to 195,000 victims). Critics alleged that the
documentation of injuries was not complete; and that the figures
used radically underestimated the number of victims and the amount
that would be needed to care for them. Little is known about what
the long-term effects of the poison gas are, how many more will die,
and what new injuries will surface over time. The settlement was
condemned as a sellout by both the government and the court and
as confirmation of the "political economy of technological
feudalism."85 As one commentator concluded,
There seems to be no other explanation except that it [the government] desperately
wants to propitiate foreign multinationals on which it has started relying more and
more as the potent instruments for the fulfillment of its social, economic and
political objectives ... The settlement sends out a clear message: multinationals can
operate freely in the Indian market.
8 6
In light of the public furore over the settlement, the
government felt compelled to issue a statement to the press
justifying its decision. 87 It claimed that the settlement was based on
an accurate estimate of both the number of victims and the amounts
necessary to provide for their injuries. The government suggested
that it accepted the settlement figure because it was adjudged to be
fair by the Supreme Court and said: "where else could the
government go for a larger sum? Nowhere in India, of course.
And to try to return to the courts in the U.S.A. would have been
akin to a vote of no confidence in our own judicial system."88 It
argued that Union Carbide had been intransigent and "it was the
government's assumption of 'parens patriae' of the Bhopal victims
and its tough stand which obliged UCC to raise its figure."8 9  It
85 U. Baxi, "Revictimizing the Bhopal Victims" (March 1989) Lex et Juris 34 at 38.
86 B. Mehta, Indian Post (22 November 1989) 8.
8 7 Hindustan Times (8 March 1989) 10.
88 Ibid
89 Ibid
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emphasized that the case had not even reached discovery, and that
to pursue the litigation would "in the most optimistic circumstances,
need anywhere from 15 to 25 more years."90  And "as for the
government paying out the money first and claiming it from Union
Carbide Corporation later, this would amount to giving UCC an
interest-free loan for meeting its liability for the duration of the
trial."91 The government claimed that the victims had been heard
through various petitions to the court and concluded that
if dealing with public interest litigations is the hallmark of judicial activism, the
Supreme Court's Bhopal decision is a step forward in innovative judicial activism
for which the court deserves to be praised. It is a matter of pride that where
foreign courts refused to take a stand, our Supreme Court dealt with a difficult
matter effectively and courageously 9
2
Vociferous public criticism was also levelled at the Supreme
Court, causing Justice E.S. Venkataramiah to threaten to resign:
"Every day you open the newspaper and you find article after article;
photograph after photograph against the court."93 Such criticism, he
said, was "worse than impeachment." The court also felt compelled
to justify its decision, and on 4 May 1989 it issued a 'judgment"
explaining the settlement 4 The court explained that its primary
consideration was the necessity of immediate relief for the victims.
While acknowledging that important legal principles were at stake,
the length of the litigation could not be justified. The "niceties of
legal principles were greatly overshadowed by the pressing problems
of very survival for a large number of victims."95 And in a stinging
criticism of its detractors and the social activists in Bhopal, the court
said:
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid
92 Ibid
93 Indian Express (4 March 1989) 2.
94 Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, (1989) 3 S.C.C. 38.
95 Ibid. at 42.
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It is indeed a matter for national introspection that public response to this great
tragedy which affected a large number of poor and helpless persons limited itself
to the expression of understandable anger against the industrial enterprise but did
not channel itself in any effort to put to ether a public supported relief fund so
that the victims were not left in distress.9 6
The court also remarked that it would not be influenced by
t"agitational measures":
Here, many persons and social action groups claim to speak for the victims, quite
a few in different voices. The factual allegations on which they rest their approach
are conflicting in some areas and it becomes difficult to distinguish truth from
falsehood and half-truth, and to distinguish as to who speaks for whom.9 7
The court explained that it had based its compensation
calculations upon figures derived from previous settlement
negotiations which were submitted to the court by the parties. It
accepted Union Carbide's position that it would not pay more than
the 350 million dollars that it had offered two years previously (plus
interest). The court said that this figure would provide reasonable
compensation based on the estimated number of deaths and injuries
accepted in the High Court.98 The court indicated that it was
reasonable to discount the total number of claims because "doubts
that a sizeable number of them are either without any just basis or
[were] otherwise exaggerated could not be ruled out."99 It pointed
out that the total figure would provide compensation to the victims
on a higher scale than the sums conventionally awarded in India in
personal injury and fatal accident cases.
Finally, the court recognized that the opportunity to address
important social, technological, and legal issues had been lost. But,
it concluded:
[I]n the present case, the compulsions of the need for immediate relief to tens of
thousands of suffering victims could not, in our opinion, wait till these questions,
vital though they be, are resolved ... The tremendous suffering of thousands of
9 6 IbidL at 43.
97 Ibid at 51.
98 2660 deaths and 30,000-40,000 serious injuries.
99 Union Carbide, supra, note 94 at 45.
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persons compelled us to move into the direction of immediate relief which, we
thought, should not be subordinated to the uncertain promises of law.
1 0 0
B. Unsettling
Union Carbide complied with the order in March 1989
producing bank certificates to prove payment. However, in the
meantime, victims' organizations filed petitions to overturn the order.
The court had left open the possibility of review, remarking that
"like all other human institutions, this Court is human and fallible":
[Tihe case equally concerns the credibility of, and the public confidence in, the
judicial process. If, owing to the pre-settlement procedures being limited to the
main contestants in the appeal, the benefit of some contrary or supplemental
information or material, having a crucial bearing on the fundamental assumptions
basic to the settlement, have been denied to the court and that, as a result, serious
miscarriage of justice, violating the constitutional and legal rights of the persons
affected, has been occasioned, it will be the endeavour of this Court to undo any
such injustice.0/
The challenges to the settlement fell into two categories.
The first relied on both general principles of natural justice and
Order 23 of the Code of Civil Procedure which requires that the
victims be heard prior to any settlement. They also urged that the
dismissal of criminal charges was illegal in the context of civil
litigation. A panel of the Supreme Court was struck on 5 March to
begin hearing the petitions. It stayed the settlement order while
listening to arguments for two months.
At the same time, a constitutional bench of the Supreme
Court was struck to hear arguments challenging the constitutional
validity of the Bhopal Act. Victims' groups argued that it deprived
the victims of their fundamental right of access to justice, that the
Act violated Article 21 of the constitution protecting the victims'
right to life, that section 9 of the Act violated Article 14 of the
constitution (equality before the law), and that the government's
conflict of interest rendered it incapable of fairly representing the
victims. The petitioners attacked the government's use of the
100 Ibid at 51.
101 Ibid at 51-52.
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parens patriae power on the basis that it can only be used when the
state is suing to enforce the rights of the state as opposed to those
of individuals. A third set of petitions assumed the finality of the
settlement and sought immediate interim distribution of part of the
funds.
On 22 December 1989, the first constitutional bench
dismissed the latter appeal, upholding the constitutional validity of
the Bhopal Act. The court reasoned that the exercise of the parens
patriae power was justified in the circumstances, given the
powerlessness of the victims when ranged against the resources of
the multinational, and that the Act did provide sufficient protection
for the interests of the victims. And while the court recognized that
the settlement may have been imperfect, especially insofar as the
victims were not consulted, it concluded that "in view of the
magnitude of the misery involved and the problems in this case' the
imperfections should be tolerated. "To do a great right after all, it
is permissible sometimes to do a little wrong."102
In late November 1989, the Gandhi government lost the
national election to a coalition led by V.P. Singh and the pleas from
the social activists that the settlement be revoked were renewed. On
12 January 1990, the new Law Minister, Mr. Dinesh Goswami,
announced that the government would support the demands of the
victims for increased compensation and would join in the effort to
have the settlement overturned.103
VII. CONCLUSION
Despite significant departures from traditional litigation
models, when measured against the criteria suggested at the
beginning of this paper, the Bhopal story is about the failure of law.
It would be unfair not to acknowledge the sincere and vigorous
efforts that have been made on behalf of the victims by dedicated
102 Charan Lal Sahu et at v. Union of India, writ petition no. 268 of 1989 in U. Baxi &
A. Dhanda, eds, Valiant Victirns and Lethal Litigation: The Bhopal Case (Bombay: N.M.
Tripathi, 1990) 550 at 613.
103 "Bhopal Settlement Denounced" Globe and Mail (13 January 1990) A10.
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social activists and government officials. The Bhopal Gas Tragedy
Relief and Rehabilitation Department has undertaken the enormous
task of attempting to reconstruct a community that has been
virtually decimated by the disaster. It has sought to provide
assistance to the victims and to begin rebuilding the social
infrastructure destroyed in the gas leak. Yet, the department is
underfunded and understaffed, and its projects are buffeted by
political winds. The Principal Secretary confirms that the litigation
has gotten in the way of the department's efforts at every stage.104
Funding has been delayed, uncertainty makes planning extremely
difficult, and the adversarial nature of the proceedings has made the
collection and sharing of information almost impossible. The
amount spent on litigation so far vastly exceeds any compensation
received by the victims 05
Even assuming that the settlement will be upheld, it will be
years before the victims receive compensation, and there is no
guarantee that it will be adequate. There are currently 602,435
claims on file with the Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief and
Rehabilitation Department and each file contains up to forty pages
of materials including claim forms, medical reports, and X-rays.106
The documentation that has been done so far fills four warehouses;
and merely bringing the claims documents to court would require
an estimated forty trucks. And assuming that the claims could be
examined as quickly as one per hour, it would take over two
hundred work years just to complete the paperwork. The
compensation scheme contemplates the appointment of sixty judges
to adjudicate the validity and quantum of individual claims. Yet, at
the beginning of 1990, these officials had not been appointed and
no infrastructure was in place to process claims. Given the
problems of determining medical causation, it will be impossible in
many cases to distinguish valid claims. And if claims are
104 S. Sathyam, Principal Secretary, Bhopal Gas Tragedy Relief Commission (personal
interview, 13 December 1989).
105 Indian Post (27 November 1988) reports that UCC alone has spent 1 billion rupees
so far on the litigation (approx. 58 million U.S. dollars).
106 T. Allen-Mills, "Red Tape Snarls Aid to India Gas Victims" Vancouver Sun (11 March
1989) B2.
[VCOL. 29 NO. 1
Lessons From Bhopal
individualized according to the severity of the claimant's injuries,
lifespan, earning capacity, and so on, the delay will be further
aggravated. Setting the levels of compensation is further
complicated by the necessity of working backwards from a fixed sum.
The Commission still does not possess accurate estimates of the
extent of the injuries nor of the needs of the victims. Even more
problematically, any estimate of compensation levels will be
undermined by the lack of knowledge about the long-term effects of
the MIC poisoning. Already, many of the one hundred thousand
people who have been classified as only mildly affected by the gas
are showing deteriorating symptoms, including tuberculosis and other
respiratory complications, gastro-intestinal problems, and
deteriorating eyesight. Medical and social activists point out that
almost no attention has been paid to the increasing evidence of
chromosome damage, immune deficiency, and mental health
problems. As the Principal Secretary of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy
Commission confirmed, "we really don't know what the future has in
store for us."1 7
The Bhopal episode was unique only in the magnitude of its
consequences. During the course of the Bhopal litigation itself,
dozens of other chemical leaks occurred throughout India resulting
in hundreds of injuries.108 An International Labour Organization
project, undertaken in the wake of the Bhopal tragedy has identified
four hundred chemical facilities in India that constitute major
industrial hazards. 1°9 Hazardous incidents resulting from the leak or
misuse of toxic chemicals occur on a frighteningly regular basis in
every country, regardless of its state of development. The U.S.
E.P.A. discovered a total of 6,928 such incidents between 1980 and
1985, resulting in an estimated one hundred fifty deaths and fifteen
107 Sathyam, supra, note 104.
1 0 8 Indian Post (17 March 1988) reports on a leak of ammonia gas from a chemical plant
near Bombay resulting in one hundred injuries. There have been at least four such leaks over
the past year in this state alone.
109 Hindustan Tmes (11 May 1989).
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hundred injuries" A similar data base in Canada has recorded
twenty-three thousand spills in a fifteen year period.111
Nor is the failure of information unique to situations
involving Third World countries. While chemicals represent about
ten per cent of total world trade,112 far too little is known about
their risks to health and environment. For example, information on
health hazards is available on only ten per cent of all pesticides.
113
This, notwithstanding that there may be as many as one million
pesticide poisonings per year in the world.114
Nor is the failure of law unique to the Third World. There
is little reason to feel complacent about the ability of Canadian
regulators to prevent such a disaster, or about the capacity of
Canadian law to respond to one. Environmental objectives,
standards, and compliance timetables are products of negotiation
between government and industry. Regulatory resources are limited
and the bargaining power of industry is large. The chemical
industry, for example, is the fifth largest industrial sector in
Canada,115 and is dominated by multinationals. In its brief against
110 This study examined incidents involving both toxic materials and radioactive materials.
It was conducted for the U.S. E.P.A. "Acute Hazardous Data Base," Washington D.C.: noted
in World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Futurc (The
Brundland Report) (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 1987) at 228 [hereinafter
Brundtland Report].
111 Environmental Protection Service, National Analysis of Trends in Emergencies
System, reported in Bhopal Aftermath Review Steering Committee, Bhopal Aftermath Review:
An Assessment of the Canadian Situation (Ottawa: Environment Canada, 1986) (Chair D.W.
Bissett) at 41-42.
112 Brundtland Repor supra, note 110 at 224.
113 Ibid. at 224.
114 See D. Weir & M. Shapiro, Circle of Poison: Pesticides and People in a Hungry World
(San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1981); Hazarika, supra, note 1
at 18 citing World Health, August-September 1984; C.S. Pearson, Down to Business:
Multinational Corporations, The Environment and Development (Washington D.C.: World
Resources Institute, 1985) at 2 citing United Nations Economic and Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific, Committee on Industry, Technology, Human Settlements and the
Environment, Seventh Session, 6-12 September 1983.
1 1 5 Bhopal Aftermath Review, supra, note 111 at 35.
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greater access to information, the Canadian Chemical Producers'
Association threatened:
It is a fact that if unnecessary or excessive costs, delays or uncertainty are
introduced unilaterally by any country, (or province), innovation and development
will simply cease or be transferred to jurisdictions with a more favourable business
climate. Should this happen in Canada, it could be very quickly reduced to a
warehouse economy for chemicals
11 6
Numerous Canadian studies have confirmed that governmental
agencies rely heavily upon industry for information and
self-monitoring, that enforcement is sporadic, and that the minimal
fines for environmental offences are treated as a cost of doing
business.117  For example, a recent study of waste management in
British Columbia found that "a substantial number of firms habitually
violate environmental and occupational health and safety regulations"
and that they are virtually immune from punishment. 118 And while
public and private compensation systems in this country may be
more adequate than in India, they are far from perfect. Class
actions are highly restricted, 11 9 proof of negligence is difficult,
traditional theories of causation may bar recovery for "statistical
injuries,"120 and the high cost of litigation remains a significant
barrier to fair compensation.
At a minimum, the lessons of Bhopal require that attention
be focused on the allocation of responsibilities among the various
116 Canadian Chemical Producers' Association, Position Paper on Confidentiality, quoted
in T.F. Schrecker, Political Economy of Environmental Hazards (Ottawa: Law Reform
Commission of Canada, 1984) at 69.
117 See generally Schrecker, ibid
118 R. Brown & M. Rankin, "Persuasion, Penalties, and Prosecution: Administrative v.
Criminal Sanctions" in M.L Friedland, ed., Securing Compliance: Seven Case Studies (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1990) at 325.
1 1 9 Naken v. General Motors of Canada Ltd (1983), 144 D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
120 See Probabilistic Causation, supra, note 9. The tendency to reverse the onus of proof
of medical causation in difficult cases, begun in the case McGhee v. National Coal Board,
[1973] 1 W.L.R. 1, has been rejected by the Supreme Court of Canada in Farrell v. Snell
(August 1990) Doe. No. 20873 though the court indicated that in appropriate cases a plaintiff
need not establish proof of causation to a scientific standard.
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actors in hazardous industrial sectors. Especially in the case of joint
ventures, technology transfers, and multinational undertakings,
responsibility can too easily fall through the links in complex chains
of command. In addition to Bhopal and Chernobyl, the problems of
acid rain and atmospheric warming are increasingly revealing the
global consequences of hazardous industries. As both an importer
and exporter of hazardous technologies, Canada has an interest in
participating vigorously in the development of international
environmental law.
As the Bhopal saga illustrates, if Canada maintains a
fault-based regime, legal processes must be devised that more
effectively maximize available compensation funds and reduce
administrative costs; that relieve individuals of the burden of
litigation; and that consolidate claims while maintaining due regard
for the individual interests and concerns of the victims. This
challenge may be especially important in view of the limited
availability of the class action in this country. One immediately
realizable goal is the development of a scheme of interim financial
assistance for all victims of disasters, large and small 21 Similarly,
existing guarantees of financial responsibility, minimum capitalization
and mandatory insurance requirements should be re-examined. The
commitment to an "all-purpose!' corporate veil must be constantly
tested against the requirements of public safety and environmental
quality.1 22  The notions of absolute responsibility for industrial
hazards and enterprise liability deserve serious consideration as
means for partially removing the burden of litigation from the
victims of environmental disasters. Ultimately, however, the failings
of the Bhopal Act and subsequent litigation teach the necessity of
going further towards developing a model of public responsibility 23
which separates the process of compensation from that of litigation.
This could be achieved by strengthening public welfare schemes, and,
121 See, for example, the proposed Rules of Court, B.C. on "Interim Payment of
Damages, Debt or Other Sum Including Costs."
122 A glimmer of hope along these lines is the decision in Berger v. Willowdale A.M.C.
(1983), 41 O.R. (2d) 89, 145 D.LR. (3d) 247 (Ont. C.A).
123 See Gaskins, supra, note 9.
[VOL. 29 NO. 1
1991] Lessons From Bhopal 49
perhaps, by developing superfund models of compensation and
litigation. These models would entitle the victims of industrial and
environmental hazards to at least a minimum of compensation from
a public fund.124 The fund would, in turn, be financed by risk
premiums from industry or through subrogated rights of action.125
The Bhopal story is replete with ironies and contradictions.
The sovereign state of India, proud of its hard won independence
from colonial rule, resorts to the courts of a foreign nation to obtain
justice for its citizens. A major multinational corporation, whose
policy is to maintain "centralized integrated corporate strategic
planning, direction and control 126  argues that it had no
responsibility for its subsidiary. And the courts of a country that is
"among the foremost exporters of effective liberal legal ideologies
for the ex-colonial nations of the Third World, '127  concludes that
the American legal system is incapable of even assuming jurisdiction
over an American-based corporation, much less providing a remedy
to the victims of the disaster.
In the end, the Bhopal story is one of incredible human
suffering as yet unredeemed by significant positive responses from
the political, legal, and business communities. The law proved itself
entirely unable to prevent the disaster, and as yet unable to repair
124 Ontario has begun this process by enacting its "Spills Bill," supra, note 20. For a
discussion of superfund approaches to compensation see P.J. Strand, 'The Inapplicability of
Traditional Tort Analysis to Environmental Risks: The Example of Toxic Waste Pollution
Victim Compensation" (1983) 35 Stan. L Rev. 575. On such a model, the victims of
industrial and environmental accidents would be entitled to compensation from a public fund,
financed by risk premiums from industry. The fund would, in turn, be responsible for any
subsequent litigation. To solve the complex causation problems, the victims might have to
establish only "probabilistic" causation and their compensation could be reviewed on a periodic
basis rather than received in a lump sum. On the idea of probabilistic causation and
proportional recovery, see Public Law Vision, supra, note 9.
125 One such model is discussed in J. Gressner, 'The 1973 Japanese Law for the
Compensation of Pollution-Related Health Damage: An Introductory Assessment" (1975) 8
Law in Japan 7.
126 Union Carbide Corporate Charter, in Union of India's Memorandum in Opposition
to Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss, reproduced in Baxi & Paul, supra, note 4 at 62
[emphasis omitted].
127 Ibid at iii.
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or alleviate the human distress and agony once it had occurred.
Bhopal is, as the Indian Supreme Court said, a test of the promises
of law. And for the time being, it cannot be said that those
promises have been kept.
